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Abstract 
 Following the recent plunge in the price of crude oil in the international 
market and its attendant implications on oil-exporting countries, this paper 
simulated the impact of a fifty per cent decline in world oil price on agriculture 
and household welfare using a general equilibrium model, and data from a 
social accounting matrix (SAM) for Nigeria. Results show that gross domestic 
output and supply of composites in the agriculture sectors increased 
substantially, causing agriculture prices to decline. Furthermore, the shock 
reduced incomes/expenditure in all household groups except urban-north 
households that recorded an increase. We therefore conclude that lower oil 
prices may not necessarily lead to output losses, but could boost output in other 
sectors, engendering diversification of the export base. Also, targeted 
interventions would prove more effective in mitigating the negative impact of 
oil price shocks on households than general palliative measures based on the 
results of the study.  
 
Keywords: Oil price, shocks, agriculture, Nigeria households, simulations, 
Income, general equilibrium  
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 More than production, crude oil price is a key variable in the global oil 
market. Changes in crude oil prices could have huge impacts on oil-importing 
and exporting countries, alike at both the macro and micro levels. At the 
macro-level, sudden changes in oil prices affect macroeconomic variables such 
as exchange rate, interest rate, and inflation and could lead to fluctuations in 
current account balance and net foreign assets position, leading to a recession 
or economic growth (Thomas, et al., 2010). 
                                                          
15Nkang M. Nkang is a Principal Manager (Economist) with the Research Department, 
Central Bank of Nigeria. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 
in any way reflect those of the Bank or its Policy. 
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  Similarly, at the micro-level, the macroeconomic outcomes of a 
sudden oil price change could have far-reaching distributional impacts on 
individuals, households and various segments of the population via three major 
effects. These include the endowment effect (which reflect changes in the 
quantum of resources available to the individual), price effect (reflecting 
changes in the reward of the resource endowments) and occupational effects 
(which are linked to changes in resource allocation) (Essama-Nssah, et al., 
2008). 
 Nigeria is a net producer/exporter of crude oil ranking 8th in the OPEC 
and 12th largest producer of oil in the world. Nigeria’s economy depends on 
revenues from the export of crude oil, which constitutes about 70 per cent of 
export earnings; over 70 per cent of government revenue and 10.45 per cent of 
GDP (OPEC, 2015; NBS, 2015a; NBS, 2015b). Given its huge reliance on 
proceeds from oil exports, the Nigerian economy is highly vulnerable to oil 
price shocks. Consequently, a small change in oil price, be it a rise or fall, can 
have a large impact on the economy. For example, Umar and Kilishi (2010) 
note that a US$1 increase in oil price in early 1990s increased Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings by about US$650 million (2 per cent of GDP at that time) 
and its public revenues by US$320 million a year.  
 The recent oil price shock of 2014 saw crude oil prices plummeting 
almost 50 per cent from average of about US$115 in June 2014 to about 
US$57.47 in April 2015, and even as low as US$30.66 in January, 2016. This 
had led to lower export earnings and low accretion to external reserves; 
substantial capital outflows particularly from portfolio investments; 
depreciation of the exchange rate from an average of N157.29/US$ in June 
2014 to an all-time high of N525/US$ in September 2016 leading to a loss in 
real incomes and purchasing power, especially for imported goods and 
services. 
 From the foregoing therefore, the oil price shock would have impacted 
not only the macro-economy but also specific sectors and households in 
different ways. Many studies that have assessed the impact of oil price shocks 
in Nigeria have always focused on the effect on macroeconomic variables of 
interest (see, for example, Alley et al., 2014; Akinyele and Ekpo, 2013; 
Adeniyi et al., 2011; Iwayemi and Fowowe, 2010; Mordi and Adebiyi, 2010; 
Olusegun, 2008). Those that have assessed the impact at the micro level are 
scarce. Thus, this paper examines the impact of an oil price shock on 
agriculture (as a dominant employment sector) and the welfare of Nigerian 
households within a general equilibrium framework, considering the strong 
link between households’ wellbeing and the agriculture sector in Nigeria. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured in four parts. Section 2 
presents the literature review covering theoretical issues and related empirical 
studies. Section 3 is concerned with the methodology; it describes the data and 
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the framework for analysis. The results are presented and discussed in section 
4 while the last section outlines the policy implications and conclusions.  
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of literature is presented in two subsections covering 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Issues 
 A shock is a sudden event beyond the control of economic authorities 
that has a significant impact on the individual or economy (see, Varangis, et 
al., 2004). It can either be positive or negative depending on whether its effect 
is beneficial or detrimental to the individual or economy. At the individual or 
household level, shocks can cause changes in household income, consumption 
and/or their capacity to accumulate productive assets. Similarly, shocks can 
cause fluctuations in national income, output and employment at the economy 
level.  
 An oil price shock is an economic shock, which could have a significant 
impact on the individual or household, as well as, aggregate effects on the 
economy. The impact of oil price shocks, whether they come through as 
positive or negative, essentially depends on whether they are studied in the 
context of an oil exporting or oil importing country. Once this key distinction 
is made, the impact of the shock on the household, sector or macroeconomic 
variables/aggregates can best be understood through their transmission 
channels.  
 Generally, the key transmission mechanisms for the impact of oil price 
shocks to either the micro or macro-economy are changes in prices (relative 
prices), employment (of labour and capital) and incomes, and changes in 
government expenditures. There is very strong evidence that these three 
channels, individually or in combination, are pervasive during a crisis (see, for 
example, Coffman, et al., 2007; Berument, et al., 2010; Mordi and Adebiyi, 
2010).  
 As earlier indicated, the effect of an oil price shock is different for net 
oil importers and net oil exporting nations. For net importing countries a shock 
that increases oil prices could lead to a fall in output growth in many economic 
sectors, particularly in the industrial and transport sectors, largely due to an 
increase in energy costs. In addition, the high energy costs could lead to 
increased production costs, which could cause private investment to fall and 
could further affect the competitiveness of the oil importing country. 
Moreover, an oil price shock can affect the balance of payments of the net-
importing country through changing terms of trade. The extent of this effect 
will however depend largely on the share of oil in total imports of the country. 
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 On the individual and household level, an oil price shock could lead to 
an increase in food prices as a result of the cost of production of food, like cost 
of inorganic fertilizers and transportation. Food prices could further increase 
from this shock due to increased competition for inputs, as a result of the 
incentive for agriculture and manufacturing to replace crude oil with biofuels, 
which use crops such as cereals and sugar cane (Mondi et al., 2011).  
 Furthermore, since the share of households’ consumption of food and 
fuel is significant, high oil prices could bring about substantial inflationary 
pressures. This is even more so for developing countries, where inflation has 
been linked to increases in international oil prices and domestic demand 
pressures. (Rasche and Tatom, 1977; Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sanchez, 2005). 
Beyond this, the drop in purchasing power as a result of the inflationary 
pressures and fall in domestic output, in turn weakens domestic demand, which 
could lead to a fall in the demand for factors of production particularly labour 
and capital, and thus could worsen unemployment.  
 For oil exporting countries, one of the main transmission channels for 
the impact of an oil price shock is through their effect on government revenue 
and expenditure. This is because most of the oil revenue in these countries is 
earned by the government.  In fact, changes in oil prices are reflected in the 
expenditure patterns of the government of oil exporting countries. This has 
translated to procyclical fiscal policy in such countries, in which fluctuations 
in economic activity intensify in relation to changes in oil prices (Sturm et al., 
2009; Cantore, et al., 2012). In spite of the procyclical nature of fiscal policy, 
there is evidence that while a fall in oil prices leads to economic stagnation in 
net oil exporting countries, a rise in oil prices does not lead to sustained 
economic growth. This thus presupposes that the impacts of oil price shocks 
are asymmetrically linked to fiscal policy, and that transmission mechanisms 
of positive and negative oil price shocks may be different, due to several factors 
including poor management and rent-seeking behaviour in the allocation of 
increased resources during a positive price shock (Mordi and Adebiyi, 2010; 
Moshiri and Banihashem, 2011). A price increase directly increases real 
national income through higher export earnings, though part of this gain may 
be later offset by losses from lower demand for exports generally due to the 
economic recession suffered by trading partners.  
 A fall in the price of oil would have profound effects on the government 
spending, which can affect labour demand, relative prices, direct transfers to 
households and the provision of public goods and service, which benefit the 
poor. Oil price changes also entail demand-side effects on consumption and 
investment. Consumption is affected indirectly through its positive relation 
with disposable income. Oil price rises reduce the consumers spending power. 
Investment may also be affected if the oil price shock encourages producers to 
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substitute less energy intensive capital for more energy-intensive capital (see, 
Daniel, 1997; Hamilton, 1996).  
 Again, if there is a reduction in government spending following a fall 
in oil prices, inflationary pressures are likely to be low, and depending on the 
consumption patterns of household categories, some would likely experience 
an improvement in their real incomes (see, Cashin and Patillo, 2000; Olomola 
and Adejemo, 2006).  However, if inflationary pressures arise as a result of a 
positive oil price shock, the efficacy of monetary policy in maintaining price 
stability could constrained. This is particularly due to the inclination of the 
government to pursue expansionary fiscal policies.  
 
2.2 Related Empirical Literature 
 Although the body of empirical evidence linking oil price shocks with 
economic outcomes is vast, specific studies for Nigeria relating oil price 
shocks to agriculture and household welfare are scanty. The scope of this 
review therefore covers Nigeria and non-Nigerian studies as well as the general 
impact of oil price shocks.   
 Alley et al. (2014) examined the impact of oil price shocks on economic 
growth in Nigeria using annual data from 1981 to 2012 and the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) for analysis of the data. Their results indicated 
that oil price shocks impacted economic growth negatively but not 
significantly. However, positive oil price shocks significantly benefitted oil 
exporting countries like Nigeria, which was in line with received wisdom. The 
authors therefore concluded that oil price shocks created uncertainty and 
undermined effective management of crude oil revenues hence the negative 
effect of oil price shocks. 
 Ikram and Waqas (2014) empirically examined the impacts of crude oil 
price fluctuations on agriculture productivity growth from 1980 to 2003 in 
Pakistan. The authors made use of co-integration and error-correction 
technique in analysing annual time-series data for the period. The results of the 
study indicated that oil prices and excess intake of fertilizer have negative 
impact on agricultural productivity growth.  
 Binuomote and Odeniyi (2013) carried out a study to empirically assess 
the effect of crude oil prices on agricultural Productivity in Nigeria between 
1981 and 2010 using annual time series data and the co-integration and error 
correction technique for analysis. The results of the analysis showed that oil 
prices in Nigeria during the period were negatively related to agricultural 
productivity as a 10 per cent increase in oil prices led to a 0.4 and 0.34 per cent 
fall in agricultural productivity in the short- and long-run respectively. The 
study concluded that crude oil prices actually had a negative and significant 
effect on agricultural production in Nigeria. 
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 Akinyele and Ekpo (2013) studied oil price shocks and 
Macroeconomic performance in Nigeria using quarterly data which spanned 
1973Q1 to 2010Q4 within the VAR framework in order to determine both 
symmetric and asymmetric impacts of oil price shocks on macroeconomic 
variables. The main findings of their study indicate that positive oil price 
shocks have both strong short- and long-run impacts on real GDP, triggering 
inflation and domestic currency depreciation as imports rise. The findings also 
reveal that positive oil shocks lead to expansionary fiscal policy stance in the 
short-term. In conclusion, symmetric shocks do not pose significant 
inflationary threat to the Nigerian economy but improves the level of GDP in 
the short-run, while asymmetric effects show that both positive and negative 
oil price shocks influence real government expenditure in the long-run, among 
other variables.  
 Udoh and Eghuaikhide (2012) examined the co-movement and 
causality relationship between oil price fluctuations and domestic food price 
inflation in Nigeria for the 1970 to 2008 period. The study analysed annual 
time-series data for the said period, using tests for stationarity, cointegration 
and Granger causality as well as multivariate regression. Their results provided 
evidence in support of a causal relationship between oil price distortions and 
food price instability in Nigeria. The paper thus, concludes that oil price 
volatility complements domestic food price inflation in Nigeria. 
 Assessing the impact of oil price shocks on economic growth in 
Nigeria, Adeniyi, et al., (2011) used the VAR methodology to analyse 
quarterly time series data (comprising measures of oil price shock, inflation, 
real interest rate, real exchange rate) from 1985Q1 to 2008Q4. Their results 
show that the impact of oil price shocks on most of the macroeconomic 
variables in Nigeria is very minimal. Specifically, the results confirmed that 
oil price shocks accounted for less than 1per cent of the variations in output, 
inflation and government revenue. The authors concluded that although a 
policy of diversification is usually recommended for economies which depend 
solely on oil revenue, the applicability of such an option appears unclear in 
Nigeria based on their findings. 
 Iwayemi and Fowowe (2010) studied the impact of oil price shocks on 
selected macroeconomic variables in Nigeria using quarterly time series data 
spanning 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. Granger-causality tests, impulse response 
functions, and variance decomposition analysis were used in the analysis of 
data.  The results of their analysis showed that different measures of linear and 
positive oil shocks did not cause output, government expenditure, inflation, 
and the real exchange rate. Moreover, the results support the existence of 
asymmetric effects of oil price shocks as negative oil shocks significantly 
cause output and the real exchange rate. The study concludes that oil price 
shocks account only for a small amount of forecast variation for most 
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macroeconomic variables in the model. Also, positive oil shocks contributed 
less than 2 per cent to the variation in most variables with the exception of net 
exports, where oil shocks accounted for as much as 6per cent of the variation 
in the variable. Finally, there is evidence of the asymmetric effects of oil 
shocks as negative oil shocks had a more pronounced effect on the macro 
economy.  
 Mordi and Adebiyi (2010) examined the effects of oil price shocks on 
output and prices in Nigeria. The study used a structural VAR model to analyse 
the impact of oil price shocks on output and prices based on monthly time-
series data from 1999M1 to 2008M12. Their results show that the impact of 
oil price shocks on output and prices is asymmetric in nature; with the impact 
of oil price decrease significantly greater than oil price increase. Also, oil price 
changes play a significant role in determining the variance decompositions of 
output and prices. Based on the results, the authors concluded that any policy 
that is aimed at moving the economy forward must focus on price stability in 
which changes in oil price play a significant role. 
 Assessing the dynamic relationship between oil production and food 
insecurity in Nigeria, Akpan (2009) used the VAR methodology to analyse 
quarterly time-series data from 1970 to 2007. The result of the analyses showed 
a decline in food production, occasioned by the neglect of the agricultural 
sector. It further indicated that high food imports contributed significantly to 
shocks in food supply but not significantly in determining food security. In 
conclusion, the study reiterated the need for policies that will enhance domestic 
production of staple foods and reduce the over dependence on the oil resource 
in Nigeria. 
 Olusegun (2008) examined the impact of oil price shocks on the 
Nigerian economy using annual time series data spanning 1970 to 2005 and 
the VAR framework to analyse the impact of oil price shocks on several 
macroeconomic variables (real gross domestic product, consumer price index, 
real oil revenue, real money supply, real government recurrent expenditure, 
real government capital expenditure). Results show that oil price shocks 
significantly contribute to the variability of oil revenue and output, while oil 
price shock does not have substantial effects on money supply, price level and 
government expenditure. Further results show that the variability in the price 
level is explained substantially by output and money supply shocks. The study 
concludes that oil price shocks have produced a small and modest impact on 
the money supply, suggesting a limited role of monetary policy in influencing 
economic activity, making government expenditure the major determinant of 
the level of economic activity.  
 The current study differs from the ones reviewed above in terms of both 
data and methodology used and the questions pursued, as well. Moreover, the 
studies are not only based on partial equilibrium analyses but also used time-
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series data. Apart from these, most of the studies (Alley et al., 2014; Akinyele 
and Ekpo, 2013; Adeniyi et al., 2011; Iwayemi and Fowowe, 2010; Mordi and 
Adebiyi, 2010; Olusegun, 2008) assessed the impact of oil price shocks on 
either economic growth or other macroeconomic variables (like inflation, 
government expenditure, real exchange rate, money supply, etc.). Even the few 
(like, Binuomote and Odeniyi, 2013; Udoh and Eghuaikhide, 2012; Akpan, 
2009) that assessed the impact of oil price shocks variously on agriculture 
productivity growth, food security and domestic food price inflation did not 
consider its impact on households in terms of welfare. These are the major gaps 
that the current study attempts to fill. The current study relies on both micro 
data (from a household survey) and macro data (from a social accounting 
matrix) to determine the impact of an oil price shock on both agriculture and 
households welfare using four representative household groups in Nigeria in a 
general equilibrium framework. This allows us to capture both direct and 




 The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Nigeria compiled by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 2010 provided the 
database used for the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model analysis 
(see Nwafor, et al., 2010). Generally, sources for SAM data include: System 
of National Accounts, Input-Output Tables, Household Surveys, and so on. 
Thus, data for the said SAM were obtained from publications of the NBS, 
CBN, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (FMAWR) 
and the 1995 UNDP SAM for Nigeria (Nwafor, et al., 2010).   
 The IFPRI SAM was the latest and the most detailed SAM of the 
Nigerian economy, especially with regard to the agricultural sector as at the 
time of writing this paper.  It is made up of 147 balanced matrix accounts 
comprising 61 activity sectors, 62 commodities, 3 factors of production, 12 
household groups, 4 tax accounts, as well as, transaction costs, enterprises, 
government, saving and investment and the rest of the world accounts. Of the 
61 activities, 34 are in agriculture, 12 in manufacturing 13 service sectors and 
2 mining sectors.  
 For the purpose of achieving the objectives of the current paper, the 
original SAM was aggregated to one with 4 production activity sectors (food, 
other agriculture, crude oil, manufactures/services), 4 commodities (food, 
other agriculture, crude oil and manufactures/services), 2 factors of production 
                                                          
16 This section draws immensely from Nkang et al. (2013). Simulating the Impact of 
Exogenous Food Price Shock on Agriculture and the Poor in Nigeria: Results from a 
Computable General Equilibrium Model. Economic Analysis and Policy, Vol. 43 No 1, pp. 79-
94 
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(labour and capital), 4 household groups (rural-south, rural-north, urban-south 
and urban-north), 4 tax accounts (direct tax, indirect sales tax, import tax and 
activity tax), government, saving and investment and the rest of the world 
accounts.  In the end a balanced SAM of 21 square matrix accounts was 
obtained and used in the subsequent analysis. From the modified SAM, all the 
data needed for calibration of the CGE model, aside the free parameters were 
obtained.  
 
3.2 Analytical Framework  
 This paper used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to 
determine the impact of an oil price shock on agriculture and households’ 
welfare. A CGE model was used in order to generate the economy-wide 
(macro) impacts of the shocks on the agriculture sector, as well as, the 
distributional impacts on households’ expenditures (used to proxy household 
welfare). The intuition behind this choice is that economic shocks are both 
idiosyncratic and covariate in nature; having economy-wide, sectoral and 
distributional effects and thus, are preferably studied in the context of a CGE 
model.  
 In the current framework, household categories are explicitly 
integrated into a CGE model via the SAM. A popular approach in this 
framework is the extended representative household (ERH) CGE model, which 
is a standard approach in general equilibrium analysis of distributional 
implications of economic shocks and policies (see, Cockburn, 2001; Bhasin 
and Obeng, 2004; Essama-Nssah, 2005). Thus, with some modifications, this 
study adopted the ERH approach proposed by Decaluwe, Patry, Savard and 
Thorbecke (1999) and Decaluwe, Savard and Thorbecke (2005) and applied 
widely in the context of many African countries. Consequently, instead of 
using one household in the model, four household groups described in the 
previous section were incorporated into the SAM to allow us capture the 
distributional impacts of the shock.  
 
3.3 Description of the CGE Model  
 In this subsection, we describe CGE model equations by blocks without 
the model specification, parameters and variables in the model due to 
limitation of space (see notes in the appendix).   
 
3.3.1 Production and Factor Demand 
 The model assumes that producers maximize profits subject to 
production functions, while households maximize utility subject to budget 
constraints. Furthermore, factors are mobile across activities, available in fixed 
supplies, and demanded by producers at market clearing prices. The model 
satisfies Walras’ law in that the set of commodity market equilibrium 
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conditions are functionally dependent, and it is homogenous of degree zero in 
prices. The model comprises six blocks of equations describing production and 
factor demand, income and savings, demand for commodities, prices, 
international trade as well as equilibrium and market clearing2. Without going 
into extensive detail, we discuss the main features of the CGE model below. 
Using a CES production function for value-added, we assume that 
producers have a profit-maximizing behaviour which is subject to the 
production function. Since the production system in the model is nested, at the 
top level of aggregation, value-added and intermediate inputs combine in fixed 
proportions, via a Leontief aggregator function to produce gross sectoral 
output. At the next level of aggregation, value-added is a constant returns to 
scale constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of labour and capital, 
as factors of production and intermediate inputs in Leontief technology 
(equations 1-3). 
 
3.3.2 Income and Savings 
 In this model, households derive their income from three sources: 
primary factor (labour and capital) payments, transfers from the government 
and transfers from the rest of the world (remittances from abroad). Household 
savings is specified as a fixed proportion of household’s disposable income. 
Government revenue is generated from direct taxes collected on household 
income, indirect taxes on domestic goods and production activities, and taxes 
levied on imports, plus dividends paid to government as well as foreign 
transfers to government. Government savings are obtained from the difference 
between government income and expenditures; made up of government 
consumption and transfers made to households (equations 4 – 16) 
 
3.3.3 Demand for Commodities 
 Household expenditure is derived from maximizing the Stone-Geary 
linear expenditure system (LES) subject to the household’s budget constraint. 
Household’s total consumption expenditure is given by household disposable 
income less savings. Government demand for commodities as well as 
investment demand is modelled using a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
(equations 17 – 20). 
 
3.3.4 Prices 
 The price block of the model is given by equations 21 – 23, which 
define the import price, export price and the consumer price index. 
 
3.3.5 International Trade 
 We assume in a standard fashion that Nigeria is small open economy 
and thus we follow the Armington (1969) assumption of imperfect 
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substitutability between domestically produced and imported goods to model 
import demand, using a CES function. In a similar manner, exports are 
modelled using a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, with the 
believe that exports are also not perfect substitutes for domestically produced 
goods in importing countries, thus characterising the relative facility of a 
producer to switch between producing for the domestic and foreign markets 
(equations 24 – 29).  
 
3.3.6 Equilibrium, Market Clearing and Model Closures 
 In this model, we ensure equilibrium in the factor markets for labour 
and capital, product markets for the commodities as well as balance of 
payments equilibrium of the foreign sector. As indicated earlier, the economy 
has no impact on international markets, and so takes the world prices as given. 
Thus, world prices of imports and exports and dividends paid to the rest of the 
world are exogenously fixed. The next closure condition is that the supply of 
labour and capital are also exogenous to the model, as are the nominal 
exchange rate (which is the model numeraire) and foreign savings, as well as, 
government savings and transfers to households. The price index is 
endogenous and allows for the clearing of the foreign savings (or the current 
account balance). The model therefore follows the classical closure, as savings 
is investment-driven (equations 30 – 35).  
 The CGE model described above was implemented with the aid of the 
General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software package, using 
CONOPT3 Solver for Non-Linear Programming (NLP). This was used 
because the model was specified as a system of non-linear equations with an 
objective function to be optimized, and in this case by maximization. Thus, the 
model was solved by maximizing the objective function specified in equation 
35 (see appendix notes). On successfully solving the model and replicating the 
baseline equilibrium, the simulation experiment was carried out and the result 
measured against the baseline to give us the impact of the shock.  
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 The results of the simulation experiment of the impact of a 50 per cent 
drop in oil prices on agriculture and households’ welfare are presented and 
subsequently discussed under this section. Oil prices had plummeted almost 
50 per cent from about US$115 in June 2014 to about US$57.47 in April 2015, 
and even as low as US$30.66 in January, 2016 but picked up and rallied around 
the US$50 to US$60 mark for a long time (see, CBN, 2015; Reuters, 2017, 
etc.). This, therefore, informed the level of our simulation experiment. The 
results are reported as percentage changes from baseline figures.  
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4.1 Macro Impacts 
 Table 1 shows the results of the impact of a 50 per cent fall in crude oil 
prices on some macroeconomic aggregates. While the GDP records a 7.036 
per cent increase, aggregate household income, aggregate government income 
and total savings all fell by 0.870, 7.317 and 86.300 per cent respectively. 
Theoretically, the impact of a fall in oil price on the GDP of a net oil exporting 
country is at best mixed. Some studies (see for example, Umar and 
Abdulhakeem, 2010; Cantore, et al., 2012) have shown that real GDP tends to 
rise with short-term increase in oil prices and vice versa. However, others (see,; 
Moshiri and Banihashem, 2011; Cantore, et al., 2012) are of the view that oil 
prices do not significantly slow down the pace of economic growth since the 
main transmission mechanism of oil price changes in net oil-exporting 
countries is through government revenues and expenditure. Further than these, 
while governments in net oil-exporting countries are wont to pursue 
expansionary fiscal policies during periods of high oil prices, they find it 
difficult to adopt fiscal austerity at times of falling oil prices, as they resort to 
other means (like depleting their savings and borrowing) to boost government 
revenues, maintain budgetary expenditures and bolster economic activity. This 
may substantially explain the result of the impact of the shock on GDP.  
 Following the shock, the fall in aggregate household income, 
government income and total savings is as expected. But particularly 
remarkable is the plunge in savings, which in fact corroborates the earlier 
assertion that oil-exporting countries would in the event of a fall in oil revenues 
deplete savings and borrow to finance expenditures instead of pursuing fiscal 
austerity measures. In the wake of the 2014 oil price shock and the 
accompanying drop in government fiscal revenues, the federal government 
have had to draw from the excess crude account (ECA) and borrow more from 
both domestic and foreign sources to finance budgetary expenditures.  
Table 1: Macro Results 
Variable Base Solution Percentage Change from 
Base Level 
  50% Fall in Oil Prices 
 N’Million 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 20 835 543.605 7.036 
Aggregate Household Income 15 453 200.000 -0.870 
Aggregate Government Income 5 767 877.010 -7.317 
Total Savings 976 108.977 -86.300 
Source: CGE Model Simulation Results 
 
4.2 Sectoral Impacts 
 For the sectoral impacts (see, Table 2), we distinguish the food sector 
from other agriculture to see if the impact of an oil price shock would be more 
severe on that subsector than in other agriculture. A drop in the world price of 
crude by 50 per cent raises domestic output of food and other agriculture by 
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6.339 and 30.175 per cent, respectively. This result is as expected because a 
fall in the price of oil puts pressure on the external reserves and the exchange 
rate, thus forcing it to depreciate. Accordingly, a real depreciation makes 
exports cheaper and bolsters domestic output growth especially in 
commodities where the country has comparative resource advantage in 
production. This thus raises capital factor demand by 50.864 per cent in food 
and 83.383 per cent in other agriculture. As our agricultural exports become 
more competitive, resource allocation is altered and more capital is employed 
in the agricultural sector to boost output for both the home market and exports.  
However, labour demand in the food sector drops by -14.828 per cent while it 
goes up by 3.532 per cent in other agriculture. This suggests a shift in labour 
resources out of the food sector, which may be as result of use of capital to 
increase output probably because of improvements in value chains, etc.  
 The results of the domestic production for the home market (which by 
definition is the quantity of gross domestic production minus exports) are 
similar to those of gross domestic output. Of particular note, however, is the 
increase in the level of domestic production of crude oil to the home market as 
a result of depressed prices at the international market. The increase in gross 
domestic output causes prices in food and other agriculture to fall by 6.910 and 
5.612 per cent respectively. These results are theoretically plausible, as data 
from the NBS (2015c) shows that food price inflation had dropped from 9.78 
per cent in June 2014 to 9.21 per cent in January 2015 when oil price fell from 
about $114.17 to $48.60 respectively. Also, worth mentioning is the 32.589 
per cent fall in the domestic price of crude oil, which is in line with the 
reduction in pump price (in January 2015) of crude oil products in the build-
up of the fall in oil prices in the international market.   
 Domestic sales of food and other agricultural composites (made up of 
domestic production to home market and imports) increased by 1.878 and 
12.616 per cent respectively.  Clearly, looking at the results for imports in these 
two sectors, it is safe to conclude that the increase was driven mainly by the 
high margin of increase in the domestic production to home market rather than 
imports. This also explains the fall in the price of food and other agricultural 
composites.  
 The simulated 50 per cent fall in oil prices substantially reduced 
imports in food and other agriculture sectors by 41.309 and 33.211 per cent 
respectively. However, exports in the two sectors increased by 92.361 and 
129.050 per cent in that order. The direction of response of both imports and 
exports to a fall in oil price conforms to a priori expectations and conventional 
wisdom, while the magnitude of the change is especially informative.  
Dwindling accretion to the external reserves due to falling oil prices had led to 
a worsening of net foreign assets position, triggering an exchange rate crisis 
leading to a substantial depreciation of the naira-dollar exchange rate. 
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Theoretically, this bolsters domestic production, discouraging imports and 
increasing exports as seen in the results of imports and exports in food and 
other agriculture sectors.  
 Data from the CBN (2015) shows that sectoral utilization of foreign 
exchange for visible imports fell from US$17.57 billion during the July-
December 2014 period to US$13.72 billion during the January-June 2015 
period, as the exchange rate depreciated from an average of N157.29/US$ in 
June 2014 to an average of N197.08/US$ in June 2015. By January-June 2016 
period, sectoral utilization of foreign exchange for visible imports further 
dropped to US$8.85 billion, while the exchange rate had depreciated to about 
N258/US$ in June 2016 following the introduction of a more flexible exchange 
rate regime by the Central Bank of Nigeria. From these results, a fall in oil 
price is not necessarily bad for agriculture, as it appears to be a boost to both 
local production and export supply.  
Table 2: Sectoral Results 
Variable Base Solution Percentage Change 
from Base Level 
  50% Fall in Oil Prices 
Gross Domestic Output N’Million 
Food 6 456 533.705 6.339 
Other Agriculture 549 607.186 30.175 
Crude Oil 745 559.864 0.570 
Manufactures/Services 13 083 842.85 32.723 
Domestic Production to Home market N’Million 
Food 6 451 123.349 6.254 
Other Agriculture 520 779.206 23.685 
Crude Oil 118 662.781 34.457 
Manufactures/Services 12 618 307.4 25.994 
Domestic Sales of Composite commodity N’Million 
Food 7 019 982.205 1.878 
Other Agriculture 629 509.364 12.616 
Crude Oil 120 016.425 32.732 
Manufactures/Services 17 151 628.25 2.652 
Imports N’Million 
Food 375 861.240 -41.309 
Other Agriculture 99 233.417 -33.211 
Crude Oil 1 353.644 -93.916 
Manufactures/Services 4 490 615.278 -56.382 
Exports N’Million 
Food 5 410.356 92.361 
Other Agriculture 28 827.980 129.050 
Crude Oil 7 336 897.083 0.000 
Manufactures/Services 465 535.454 194.371 
Factor Demand (Capital) N’Million 
Food 2 235 632.720 50.864 
Other Agriculture 166 128.654 83.383 
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Crude Oil 6 841 676.980 0.789 
Manufactures/Services 1 565 438.960 156.435 
Factor Demand (Labour) N’Million 
Food 3 280 392.103 -14.828 
Other Agriculture 231 495.882 3.532 
Crude Oil 18 713.492 -57.245 
Manufactures/Services 5 569 053.743 8.780 
Price  of Domestic Output  
Food 1.000 -6.910 
Other Agriculture 1.000 -5.612 
Crude Oil 1.000 -37.309 
Manufactures/Services 1.000 2.596 
Price of Domestic Output to Home Market 
Food 1.000 -6.947 
Other Agriculture 1.000 -7.995 
Crude Oil 1.000 -32.589 
Manufactures/Services 1.000 1.270 
Price of Composite Commodities 
Food 1.000 -4.969 
Other Agriculture 1.000 -3.579 
Crude Oil 1.000 -32.413 
Manufactures/Services 1.000 5.506 
Source: CGE Model Simulation Results 
 
4.3 Distributional Impacts 
 Table 3 shows the results of the impact of a 50 per cent fall in oil prices 
on households’ income and expenditure. The shock causes households’ 
disposable income and expenditure to fall except in urban north households. 
Rural households were the most affected by this shock, as rural north 
households’ expenditure fell by 6.543 per cent while rural south households 
registered a moderate fall in their expenditures by 1.401 per cent. Furthermore, 
urban south households’ expenditures dropped marginally by 0.759 per cent 
whereas the shock actually caused the expenditure of urban north households 
to increase by a significant 4.662 per cent. The results clearly indicate that rural 
households suffer more from this shock, while some urban households could 
actually benefit from it. Specifically, rural north households suffer the impact 
of a fall in oil prices most, while urban north households benefit the most from 
the shock. Urban south households seemed to be impacted the least by a 50 per 
cent fall in world price of crude oil.  
 Conceptually, the impact of an oil price shock on households in Nigeria 
(as a net oil exporter) with an enclave oil sector is indirect. This trickles down 
from the macroeconomic repercussions of the shock and from the government 
expenditure channels (which include inflation, transfers, spending on services, 
employment, etc.) as well as via exchange rate depreciation in an attempt to 
restore balance of payments equilibrium. Given this background, the 
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distributional impacts recorded above would have been determined by various 
factors acting together, which include the sources and uses of household 
incomes.  
 According to the SAM data, while the urban households received direct 
transfers from government, rural households did not. Again, the increase in the 
expenditure of urban north households could be explained by the fact that 
almost 70 per cent of their earnings came from wage (labour) income, which 
could have been switched into the production of local import substitutes as 
exports become cheaper and imports more expensive following a real 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Moreover, a fall in government revenue 
following oil price decline might tend to affect rural north households most 
because financing of rural projects that benefited rural north households might 
have been hampered in spite of the fact that government might continue to fund 
projects in the urban areas even in the face of fiscal austerity.   
Table 3: Impact on Households’ Incomes and Expenditures 
Variable  Base Solution  Percentage Change from 
Base Level  
  50% Fall in Oil Prices 
Household Disposable income  N’million  
Rural south 2642927.340 -1.401 
Rural north 3646169.671 -6.543 
Urban south 5288615.606 -0.759 




Rural south 2631340.864 -1.401 
Rural north 3598827.408 -6.543 
Urban south 3597972.672 -0.747 
Urban north 2959873.227 4.662 
Minimum Consumption (All) 12581493.448 -1.912 
Source: CGE Model Simulation Results 
 
5.0 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 The paper simulated the impact of a 50 per cent fall in world oil prices 
on agriculture and household welfare in Nigeria. From the macro results, GDP 
recorded a significant increase, while aggregate government income, 
households’ income and total savings all recorded a decline.  Sectoral results 
show that gross domestic output and supply of composites in the food and other 
agriculture sectors increased substantially forcing prices in the two agriculture 
sectors to decline. Moreover, while there was an increase in capital demand in 
the agricultural sector following the shock, there was however a fall in labour 
demand in the food sector although same went up in the other agriculture 
sector. The shock also caused Imports in food and other agriculture sectors to 
fall substantially, while there was a dramatic rise in exports in the two sectors. 
In terms of distributional impacts, there was a drop in incomes/expenditure in 
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all households except urban north households that recorded an increase. 
Furthermore, rural north households were the most negatively affected, 
whereas urban south households were the least affected by the shock.  
 The implications of these results are that while high oil prices may lead 
to increased revenue for government in Nigeria, to the neglect of the other 
productive sectors of the economy, lower oil prices may not necessarily lead 
to output losses but could actually boost output from other sectors and lead to 
diversification of the export base, even with lower accretion of foreign 
exchange earnings in the near term. Thus an oil price fall is not necessarily 
detrimental, particularly as it makes exports cheaper and imports costlier hence 
leading to increased production of import substitutes. There is therefore the 
need to reduce government’s reliance on oil revenue, and for boosting our net 
foreign assets (NFA) position. The results have shown that with falling oil 
price, food, other agriculture, and manufactures/services sectors show huge 
potential to generate foreign exchange earnings through exports. This potential 
should therefore be exploited. Furthermore, the implication of the 
distributional impacts is that targeted interventions would prove more effective 
in mitigating the negative impact of oil price shocks than general palliative 
measures as some household groups and segments of the population are 
affected more than others. On the whole, rural north households need the most 
attention based on the results of this study.            
 
NOTES 
 1. The interested reader may request for the model specification and 
GAMS code for details on the model structure. 
 2. The model specification draws extensively from the Economic 
Modelling (ECOMOD) Network model for a small open economy. 
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